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Until recently, scholars have customarily lumped multiple dimensions of environmental change into single constructs, andusually ascertained that the more the context changes, the more value firms derive from higher levels of exploration. In
sync with more recent studies focusing on specific dimensions of change, in this paper we borrow theoretical elements from
systems theory to examine the possibility that the reward to developing innovative product components may itself be eroded
by implicit and yet burgeoning costs to fit the new component technology into existing architectures, thereby dampening
system performance. Specifically, we theoretically assess how varying magnitudes of industry regulatory changes affect
the optimum level of firm exploration, and propose—counterintuitively vis-à-vis past literature—that the more radical (i.e.,
competence destroying), as opposed to incremental (i.e., competence enhancing), these changes are, the more the optimum
intensity of firm exploration recedes. Based on quantitative as well as qualitative empirical analyses from the Formula One
racing industry, we precisely trace the observed performance outcomes back to the underlying logic of our theory, stressing
that impaired capabilities to integrate the new component in the architecture redesign and time-based cognitive limitations
both operate to inhibit the otherwise positive relationship between firm exploration and performance. In the end, we offer
new insights to theory and practice.
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Introduction
Firms’ responses to environmental changes in terms
of exploration efforts are an important but still open
issue in the study of strategy and organizations (Gupta
et al. 2006, March 1991, Posen and Levinthal 2012,
Sørensen and Stuart 2000, Tushman and Romanelli
1985). Although enhancing their exploration efforts
under conditions of environmental change can allow
firms to adjust to new environments more effectively
(e.g., Blundell et al. 1999; Teece et al. 1997; Tushman
and Anderson 1986, p. 446), it can also entail increased
costs, risks, and challenges of its own that may reduce
or even outweigh the benefits it brings. As an example
of a typical managerial dilemma, should an industrial
equipment manufacturer respond to the so called “3D
printing revolution” by engineering a 3D printer system
based on the most consolidated technology available, or
by developing a more advanced prototype that is new to
the industry? In this paper, we investigate this aspect by
examining levels of optimal exploration under different
magnitudes of environmental change.
Extant literature on the subject of organizational re-
sponses to environmental change has provided mixed
results and a multitude of perspectives. For example, ear-
lier studies suggest that enhanced exploration in chang-
ing environments may yield neutral (e.g., Kim and Rhee
2009), net positive (e.g., Aghion et al. 2005, Blundell
et al. 1999, Geroski 1995, Jansen et al. 2006), or
even negative (e.g., Posen and Levinthal 2012) effects.
Tushman and Anderson (1986, p. 445) argue that as
environmental changes develop from incremental to rad-
ical, firms can no longer rely on improving efficien-
cies by refining what they already do, but rather may
have more to gain from exploring new competencies and
expertise. On the other hand, Posen and Levinthal (2012)
warn that this may not always be the case. They sug-
gest instead that as environments change ever more fre-
quently, the best value a firm can derive from exploration
can actually recede, because novel know-how either fails
to materialize or decays much more quickly in concert
with the more frequent changes in the environment.
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We develop such arguments further in this paper.
Specifically, we consider the relationship between the
magnitude of environmental change and the optimal
exploration by the firm. Our goal is to identify the best
firm strategy, under the relatively steady periods with
recurrent changes of minor degree as well as the spo-
radic radical jolts of radical magnitude. The variation in
such magnitude of environmental change is an impor-
tant issue and is a common occurrence, for example,
during political change, when regulatory agencies imple-
ment new industrial policies designed to shape new com-
petitive dynamics (Stewart 2011), or when the industry
is subject to more major technological shifts, which
tend to be less frequent than more incremental changes
(Klepper 1997). Therefore, whether the value of explo-
ration increases in this environment—as has broadly
been suggested in prior literature—or decreases, due to
other as yet ill understood mechanisms, remains an open
question.
In contrast to earlier literature, we focus exclusively
on a specific organizational mechanism and theorize
that when environmental conditions undergo shifts of
increasing magnitude, greater exploration is likely to
constitute a suboptimal strategy. We argue that as the
magnitude of environmental changes increases from
incremental toward radical (Henderson and Clark 1990),
greater exploration causes more challenges in the man-
agement of interdependencies across parts of complex
systems (Simon 1962) and stretches the organization’s
integration capabilities (Brusoni et al. 2001, Prencipe
1997). For this reason, under radical environmental
changes, increasing exploration rapidly amplifies the
costs of reintegrating and managing the architecture
of the very system that embeds the innovation, and
in the process outweighs the conventionally anticipated
benefits. Alternatively, when environmental changes are
smaller, more aggressive exploration generates superior
performance because the integration costs of complex
systems are more likely to be manageable, and thus the
net gains of exploration positive. Our analyses reveal
decreasing returns to exploration due to reasons that
are unrelated to the well-known exploration–exploitation
trade-off (March 1991). In fact, we observe that the
performance outcomes of greater exploration involving
complex systems decrease on their own, regardless of
the relative level of exploitation. Hence, by theoretically
and empirically assessing the costs of greater exploration
in terms of architectural fit, we propose and find that
more radical changes cause the optimal rate of explo-
ration to occur at ever lower, and not higher, levels of
exploration.
To isolate the causal mechanisms that relate com-
plexity and integration into an existing architecture, we
use an unconventional approach by combining quan-
titative and qualitative empirical analyses of Formula
One (F1) racing. F1 is an innovation-intensive industry
where firms—teams of engineers and drivers, backed by
deep-pocketed organizations and sponsors—try to beat
opponents with superior car design, safety, and per-
formance (Castellucci and Ertug 2010, Jenkins 2010).
The independent governing authority FIA (Fédération
Internationale de l’Automobile) imposes environmental
changes by releasing, once a year, a new set of rules
that define basic guidelines for technology advances in
the sport, thus influencing teams’ exploration strategies
and F1’s overall competitive dynamics in each racing
season. In this sense, the changes in industry regulations
operate exogenously to the process of firm exploration.
Our 30-year panel data set, which includes detailed
codifications of all F1 car blueprints (over 300 vehi-
cles), all FIA regulations, and all racing results, per-
mits a robust long-term quantitative analysis of the
exploration–performance association, as moderated by
the FIA’s regulatory changes. In turn, our qualitative
assessment of technical reports provides opportunities to
not only compare exploratory strategies across F1 teams,
but, more importantly, also help us ascertain, through
unambiguous interpretations, the underlying logics of
architectural misfits between winning and losing cars
and teams (for a similar example of mixed method appli-
cation, see Canales 2013). Because our empirical envi-
ronment involves changes that vary greatly in magnitude
(despite the predictability of their frequency), it suits the
specificities of our theory well, and helps redress possi-
ble confusions between conceptual domains of environ-
mental change (McCarthy et al. 2010).
In what follows, we first provide a detailed account of
the scope of our research and develop our hypotheses.
We then present the setup and results of our quantitative
and qualitative analyses. In the final section, we further
specify the confusions noted above and identify other
implications for theory and practice.
The Magnitude of Exogenous
Environmental Change
Studies of firms’ responses to environmental change
are neither new nor uncommon (see Bourgeois and
Eisenhardt 1988, Jansen et al. 2006, Kim and Rhee
2009, among others). But our cumulative understand-
ing is bounded by the lack of precision in the use of
constructs in extant research, which limits our ability to
synthesize an empirical consensus, generalize patterns
across studies, or understand the causal mechanisms
that drive different empirical results. McCarthy et al.
(2010) warn that the multidimensional constructs repre-
senting environmental change—e.g., dynamism (Baum
and Wally 2003, Davis et al. 2009, Jansen et al. 2006),
turbulence (Dess and Beard 1984), clock speed (Nad-
karni and Narayanan 2007a, b), and velocity (Bourgeois
and Eisenhardt 1988)—inhibit our ability to comprehend
its fundamental antecedents and consequences.
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In line with McCarthy et al. (2010, p. 604), we tackle
this issue by stressing that underlying such different
terms are two conceptually distinct constructs: the rate
(e.g., Child 1972, Wholey and Brittain 1989) and the
magnitude (e.g., Abernathy and Clark 1985, Tushman
and Anderson 1986) of change. The former represents
the frequency of changes in the environment, and reflects
time lags between successive shifts, whereas the latter
represents the size of the discontinuity of a new (tech-
nological) paradigm (Hannan and Freeman 1977, Levins
1968). Although studies on magnitude are less common
in the current literature, partly due to the difficulties of
quantifying it (McCarthy et al. 2010, p. 608), there have
been several insightful studies involving frequency.
Posen and Levinthal (2012) recently used a simula-
tion model to show that when the frequency of change
is extreme, firms are better off avoiding having to chase
fast-moving targets; that is, more exploration does not
pay off, because the more rapid decay of generated
know-how decreases its expected net returns. However,
frequency and magnitude represent distinct and comple-
mentary dimensions of change, so the theoretical logic
serving the former does not automatically transfer to
the latter. Specifically, when the frequency of change is
constant (or even decreasing), the swift obsolescence of
innovations—which, according to Posen and Levinthal
(2012), limits the expected value of exploration—is not
an issue, so that intense exploration may turn out to be
the best strategic approach in such environments.
However, we posit that other distinct issues may arise,
which are linked to different levels of magnitude of
environmental change. In fact, although environmental
changes may take place occasionally (or only once),
they can still be intense enough to reshape techno-
logical standards. This distinction between frequency
and magnitude matters, because as technological lead-
ership can quickly crumble, firms may tend to continu-
ously explore newer solutions (Tushman and Anderson
1986), but in doing so they encounter problematic mis-
fits with the overarching platform where these new solu-
tions should be integrated. Consider the recent evolution
in data storage technologies, for instance. The Blue-ray
format, since it involves a shorter laser wavelength, per-
mits the storage of vastly greater quantities of data on
a disk, promising major gains for film and video-game
consumers. But concerns regarding the integration of
this format with existing consoles and display sets, the
availability of content, and the production tooling and
systems required significantly curtailed its widely antic-
ipated success (Yoffie and Rossano 2012).
We conceptualize the magnitude of environmental
change to be either incremental or radical (Tushman and
Anderson 1986, Henderson and Clark 1990) and con-
sider how this variation affects the value of firm explo-
ration. Tushman and Anderson (1986, p. 439) explain
that when environmental changes demand incremental
innovation, they are likely to be “competence enhanc-
ing,” because firms can react by exploiting the poten-
tial of their existing designs and technologies. Such
incremental adaptation by firms does not draw from
any dramatically new science, but rather involves firms
tinkering, perhaps rather marginally, with their exist-
ing products and processes. In contrast, when changes
demand radical innovation, they are likely to be “com-
petence destroying,” because they may compel firms to
rethink their entire sets of scientific, engineering, and
design principles and skills (see also Henderson and
Clark 1990, p. 9). Basically, the distinction between the
two is one of degree, in terms of whether their adap-
tation to the new environment fundamentally alters the
set of firm competencies and skills associated with the
new technologies (Tushman and Anderson 1986, p. 442).
Consequently, this variance induces important effects on
an industry’s competitive dynamics; that is, whereas the
former reinforces the dominance of established tech-
nologies, and so increases the competitive advantage
of incumbents, the latter destroys the know-how supe-
riority of market leaders, so decreasing their competi-
tive advantages and opening up opportunities for new
entrants (Abernathy and Clark 1985, Anand et al. 2010,
Dess and Beard 1984, Ettlie et al. 1984, Henderson and
Clark 1990, Tushman and Anderson 1986).
Another issue in the study of firm responses to their
environments relates to the sources of environmental
change, which can be diverse, ranging from institutional,
technological, political, market demand, and even legal
domains (March 1991, p. 71; McCarthy et al. 2010,
p. 609; Tushman and Anderson 1986, p. 440). Generally
speaking, the more an environmental change is exoge-
nous (i.e., external) to the industry players, the more
uncertain and unpredictable this will be to the incum-
bents (March 1991). Thus, radical innovations based on
established proprietary know-how (e.g., the launch of the
iPhone) represent industry shocks that are endogenously
defined by specific organizations (i.e., Apple), whereas
the emergence of new technologies with cross-industry
application potentials (e.g., digital imaging during the
1990s, or 3D printing currently), or new industry reg-
ulations (e.g., policies that curb the use of refrigerant
gases for air conditioning devices), represent examples
of change stemming from exogenous sources.
In our model, we focus on the latter type of situ-
ation. Specifically, we examine the effects of environ-
ment changes as those triggered by a regulatory agency
that, although fundamentally involved in the industry, is
independent of any of its competitive actors. Concep-
tually, regulatory changes reflect “the change in laws
and regulations that affect an industry” (McCarthy et al.
2010, p. 609) and are deemed to be “of great importance
to organization scholars” (Hambrick and Abrahamson
1995, p. 1434). Regulations can involve a range of busi-
ness activities, such as pricing, production methods, and
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[1
38
.40
.68
.78
] o
n 1
5 S
ep
tem
be
r 2
01
5, 
at 
02
:00
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Marino et al.: Driving Performance via Exploration in Changing Environments
1082 Organization Science 26(4), pp. 1079–1100, © 2015 INFORMS
technological specifications (Ashford et al. 1985), and
are usually imposed by an impartial external agency,
such as the state, institutions, or other industry control-
ling bodies (Stewart 2011). In heavily regulated indus-
tries such as pharmaceuticals, aerospace, defense, and
healthcare (Ashford et al. 1985, Stewart 2011), although
the regulations may reflect some general industry needs,
ultimately they are enacted by authorities that are exoge-
nous to its firms and aim broadly at matters of col-
lective utility, such as better consumer welfare, faster
competitive dynamics, greater producer safety, unified
technological standards, and even enhanced ecological
preservation. In the process—and the point of central
relevance to our study—these policies influence firm
choices about how much and in which directions they
should explore and innovate (Ashford and Hall 2011,
Porter 1996) so that they can comply with regulatory
changes and so compete in the new environment. So our
focus on regulatory changes enables us to study the opti-
mal exploration strategies that firms engage in to respond
to these environmental changes.
Exploration-Based Strategies and
Firm Performance
Prior research has shown that exploration is relevant
for firm performance (March 1991) because it enables
firms to discover new knowledge—via learning by
searching—that better fits the new environment in which
they operate. Some researchers have considered explo-
ration and exploitation as orthogonal and thus achiev-
able simultaneously (Baum et al. 2000, Beckman 2006,
Koza and Lewin 1998, Rothaermel 2001). In contrast,
other studies have emphasized firms’ inability to con-
duct both concurrently at intensive levels due to scarcity
of resources (March 1996, 2006), instead suggesting
inverted-U-shaped relationships between exploration (or
exploitation) and performance.1
We start from this latter notion that exploration brings
benefits in a curvilinear manner (i.e., benefits first rise,
then fall), but offer a distinct rationale relative to this
previous literature. We stress that overexploration is
linked with issues of its own, unrelated to the well-
known exploration–exploitation trade-off (March 1991),
and which are instead related to the challenges of
fitting new components into existing and already well-
integrated system architectures. Our inverted-U rela-
tionship thus reflects the logic that as firms explore
increasingly more, they may not be able to benefit
fully from the value and novelty of what they discover.
Exploration examined at the component level overlooks
cognitive complications at the system level, which firms
handling complex products—e.g., those composed of
various interdependent parts—must grapple with, even
when their explorations yields new components that are
indeed superior. Hence, we argue that, even assuming a
firm can strike the right level of exploratory efforts vis-
à-vis the novelty value of the components it discovers
(as in the Blu-ray example), it must still grapple with
the challenge of integrating those components into its
complex product architecture, and this challenge varies
with the extent of its exploratory efforts.
The notion of product or system architecture reflects
the fact that multiple components must fit together sat-
isfactorily to make a coherent system (Brusoni and
Prencipe 2001). The distinction between the product as
a whole (i.e., the system) and its parts (i.e., compo-
nents) has a long history in the literature (see, among
others, Alexander 1964; Henderson and Clark 1990,
p. 11; Marples 1961; Simon 1962). Simon (1999, p. 16)
explains that because such multiple parts can interact in
nontrivial ways, the whole system takes a value that is
more than the sum of the individual parts. Given the
hierarchy of relations, the performance of each compo-
nent element not only depends on its own inherent qual-
ities, but also becomes a function of the output of others
it connects to, such that increasing the adjustments at the
component level can multiply the risk of system misfit.
Thus, systems that are highly complex, i.e., where indi-
vidual parts interact with multiple others,2 take signifi-
cantly longer to emerge efficient through an evolutionary
process (Simon 1962, 1999).
Our first hypothesis builds on the underlying logic of
an inverted-U-shaped relationship as being more attuned
to the problems of balancing the architecture of a sys-
tem as novel component-level upgrades are introduced
(Henderson and Clark 1990, Simon 1962). Conceptu-
ally, when individual components are innovated to fit
a new environment more aptly, they yield performance
improvements vis-à-vis the old ones. But the logic of
system decomposability suggests that the concomitant
risk of system misfit increases the more the new compo-
nent relies on technologies far from the original design
(Brusoni et al. 2001). The more distinct and specialized
the novel components become, the more likely they are
to distort the established homeostasis of the system as a
whole, and throw the entire architecture out of balance
(Simon 1962, p. 6). For example, new emissions stan-
dards may compel automakers such as Ford and General
Motors (GM) to respond to new regulatory demands by
developing engines with lower emissions. But, because
such firms are likely to hold stronger engineering com-
petencies associated with traditional engine designs, they
may struggle to retrofit such new components to existing
powertrain, axle, and wheel subsystems and so deliver
consumers acceptable vehicle performance and safety.
Hence, as exploration increases, it first enhances perfor-
mance, but the farther from its existing know-how base
a firm explores new component knowledge, the more it
must rethink a complex set of component interdependen-
cies involving the whole product system’s architectural
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fit, so that, beyond an optimum level, the marginal ben-
efits of exploration will begin to decrease. We therefore
propose the following:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Ceteris paribus, the performance
of firms relying on complex products first increases and
then decreases as exploration at the component level
rises.
A subsequent question that arises is how the inverted-U
relationship noted above behaves when subject to envi-
ronmental change of varying magnitudes. At a base
level, several prior research strands suggest that the more
the environment changes, the more firms gain from fur-
ther exploration (Brusoni et al. 2007, Jansen et al. 2006).
However, March (1991) argues that a firm’s knowl-
edge only creates value insofar as the environment in
which it operates remains the same. Received empiri-
cal wisdom about competitive dynamics also suggests
that radical change can reduce the gap between lead-
ers and followers, making the playing field more equal,
so boosting followers’ impetus to innovate (Aghion
et al. 2005, Blundell et al. 1999, Geroski 1995).3
As environmental changes erode the competitive gap
between players, rivalry intensifies, thus affecting rents
asymmetrically—reducing preinnovation rents by more
than it reduces postinnovation ones—and leading firms
to innovate to escape current competition. Similarly,
Tushman and Anderson (1986) argue that “incremen-
tal changes” are “competence enhancing” because they
“permit firms to exploit their existing competence and
expertise”; whereas “radical changes” are “competence
destroying” because they “break the existing know-how
base for the product class,” hence lowering barriers
“for new technologies to emerge” (Abernathy and Clark
1985, pp. 445–446). Thus, incremental changes drive
“orderliness and consolidation,” whereas radical ones
can “alter a product class.” As a result, the former rein-
forces existing advantages and decreases incentives to
explore, whereas the latter destroys existing advantages,
and so encourages exploration (Tushman and Anderson
1986, p. 446).
In our research, we argue that most prior studies
have overlooked the organizational challenges of greater
exploration, particularly when it comes to issues of inte-
grating novel components into complex systems. As
changes of increasing magnitude may trigger issues that,
at the margin, grow more rapidly than the benefits of
exploration, it may be easy to overestimate the net gains
if these issues are ignored. We consider the genesis of
such organizational issues in terms of the firm’s capacity
to integrate novel components into the system, given the
limits on time and its cognitive capacity.
Novel components generated in response to radical
environmental changes can impose exacting demands
on the architecture of product systems (Henderson and
Clark 1990, Brusoni et al. 2001). At a base level, envi-
ronment shifts spawn crises in the internal fit between
system components since they all fit the environment
at distinct levels of specialization. But the system per-
formance problem can quickly grow much more severe,
depending on a firm’s capacity (or lack thereof) to
integrate the system’s interrelated parts (Brusoni and
Prencipe 2006). Even where interdependencies between
elements are minor, once a firm extends its component
technologies searches, it is likely to have to devote expo-
nentially more time and resources to synchronize all
its systems’ parts properly (Simon 1962), as the know-
how needed to solve such architectural problems is often
implicit and hidden across various organizational fields
(Henderson and Clark 1990, Simon 1962). So when reg-
ulatory changes increase to significant levels, the costs of
the information processing associated with architectural
fit tend to grow considerably. This implies that beyond
the skills needed to invent new components, the system
integration capabilities of firms—which Prencipe (1997,
p. 1261) identifies as those needed to manage their entire
system’s dynamics—come to bear additional burdens.
Thus, when responding to environmental changes of
greater magnitude, firms that enhance their exploration
levels may be challenged by the risk of system failure,
even if the novel components they seek to integrate are
themselves technologically superior. For this reason, we
suggest that as regulatory changes impose more radical
technology upgrades, the optimum level of exploration
beyond what is needed for minimum compliance will
tend to recede.
The constraints on time and firm’s cognitive capacity
play an important role in this argument. Simon (1976)
suggests that once a complex system is exposed to envi-
ronmental change, the information required to coordi-
nating and fitting the multiple parts together increases
exponentially. Organizations often rely on cognitive as
well as experiential frameworks (Gavetti and Levinthal
2000, p. 113) to coordinate the changing parts of com-
plex systems. Given the radical nature of the changes
in the environment, as well as in the novelty of the
components, their cognitive frameworks are less likely
to prove adequate to the challenge of designing a new
architecture, ex ante. At the same time, in terms of
their experiential frameworks, the demands on informa-
tion and computation will necessitate ever more exper-
iments if the system is to evolve more integrated, and
these can subject the organization to greater risk of fail-
ure (Simon 1976). Because the integration of the system
rests on the interdependencies of its parts, greater mag-
nitudes of change make it harder to predict the net gains
from component-level upgrades (Brusoni et al. 2001).
At a base level, organizations tend to use simple heuris-
tics of system architectures, which are effective tools to
reduce search costs. But when regulatory changes grow
in magnitude, the complexity of system architecture can
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increase beyond the organization’s cognitive limits, mak-
ing the process of trial-and-error learning both costly
and risky. In this case, the firm may become unable to
foretell how well new arrangements of components will
fit into a cohesive architecture. Hence, we reason that
when environmental changes are increasingly more rad-
ical, the inflection point at which exploration levels are
at their optimum (H1) will recede:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Ceteris paribus, the magnitude
of environmental change negatively moderates the curvi-
linear relationship between firm exploration and per-
formance; that is, the greater the magnitude of such
change, the lower the level of exploration at which firm
performance will be maximized.
Quantitative Analysis Methods
Data: Formula One Racing
We test the above hypotheses using data from For-
mula One racing and (as explained later) derive the
underlying theoretical mechanisms driving the results by
grounding a discussion of a particular F1 racing season
(i.e., 2009) characterized by changes of high magnitude.
The F1 industry is made up of about a dozen firms
(i.e., teams) that compete in a yearly calendar of races on
different tracks around the world. Each team designs and
develops a new car prototype every year, and deploys
two official race drivers, some test drivers, and an addi-
tional group of up to 500 designers, mechanics, engi-
neers, and managers. Teams race to reach the top spot
in two classifications: the World Drivers’ Championship
and the World Constructors’ Championship. Cars’ fin-
ishing places in each race earn the winning driver and
team—and a few runners-ups—scaled numbers of points
that accumulate to a final tally at the end of the season.
The industry governing body, the FIA, releases yearly
updates of its regulations and technical protocols for the
sport, through which it indirectly controls the teams’
technological advances.4 The resources the teams outlay
to align with the FIA’s regulations, as well as those used
to compete in the F1 series, are mostly repaid by returns
deriving from global visibility and supply and sponsor-
ship contracts, as well as the commercialization of their
innovations.
Several qualities contribute to make this the ideal set-
ting for our study—indeed, as Gino and Pisano (2011,
p. 70) state, “Racing may seem a long way from the
world of business, but in fact 0 0 0 it represents a perfect
laboratory for research.” To begin with, the context per-
mits broad generalizability of results due to its similar-
ities with many other well-regulated technology-based
industries. For instance, firms compete based on the pre-
emption and deployment of their best assets (i.e., tech-
nology, key employees, capitals); exogenous forces (i.e.,
technical regulations) are significant in inducing changes
in the competitive environment; and the ensuing compet-
itive dynamics result from the interplay between these
factors. Similar effects occur across many other indus-
tries such as pharmaceuticals, aerospace, manufacturing,
chemicals, electronics, agribusiness, military engineer-
ing, healthcare, etc. (Ashford et al. 1985, Stewart 2011),
but unlike in F1, regulatory changes are hard to track and
codify in reliable ways over time in these other environ-
ments, thus only allowing for single event or case studies
(Stewart 2011). In contrast, F1 favors the combination of
qualitative and quantitative analyses; that is, on the one
hand, it facilitates empirical analyses that are at once
robust and consistent because it offers precise metrics
for regulatory changes and firm exploration, as well as
for performance, which “is unambiguously measurable
by lap times and race results” (Gino and Pisano 2011,
p. 70), and on the other, it allows for the analysis of
qualitative data that reveal the several theoretical mech-
anisms operating in the process with considerable preci-
sion. More importantly, F1 offers an environment where
firms (i.e., teams) compete by fine-tuning the delicate
integration of the complex systems represented by their
race cars. This quality is very pronounced in our later
analysis of their exploration choices during the 2009 sea-
son. In the words of Paddy Lowe, Mercedes F1 technical
chief:
These cars are about system performance, not individual
elements. It’s about how you put it all together. It’s the
power unit, the efficiency of the power unit, the aerody-
namics, and the manner in which they’re all put together.
It’s the collective efficiency of that package from a power,
aero and suspension point of view, as well as the weight
point of view.
It is worth noting that various strategy scholars have
recently extracted key theoretical insights from empiri-
cal studies in racing settings (e.g., Aversa et al. 2015,
Bothner et al. 2007, Castellucci and Ertug 2010, Jenkins
and Floyd 2001, Jenkins and Tallman 2010, Khanna
et al. 2003, Ross and Sharapov 2015).
We built our entire data set from archival data. Schol-
ars have recently cited F1 as one of the ideal research
settings thanks to availability of “big data” (George et al.
2014). We examined all official FIA regulation releases
to track all regulatory changes from 1981 (the year the
FIA demanded all teams develop their car building skills
in house, and forbade the outsourcing of chassis man-
ufacturing) up to 2010. We followed the technologi-
cal developments in each car by scrutinizing specialized
press releases, scientific/quasi-scientific research articles,
sports commentaries, and race reports, all of which came
from known industry sources, such as Formula 1 Tech-
nical Analysis (Piola 1992–2010), The Great Encyclo-
pedia of Formula 1 (Menard et al. 2010), Who Works
in Formula One (Gregoire 1990–2010), Autosport Mag-
azine, and the official F1 database Forix. Our final data
set includes 345 team-year observations from a total of
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49 racing teams over 30 years. On average, 10–15 teams
(20–30 cars) competed per season. Our data set reports
no missing team-year covariate values.
Measures
Performance. We take the best rank classification at-
tained by either of a team’s two drivers in each race
as representing the team’s performance in that race, and
then average these performance scores across all races
in the season, so that teams with lower averages outper-
form those with higher averages.5 Next, to construct a
scale assigning higher values to better performers, we
computed a measure for each team’s season performance
by setting it as the denominator, and that of the winning
team as the numerator, so that our index indicates the
winner as 1 and gives all other teams values less than 1
but greater than 0. Our performance metric thus captures
the average distance by which each team lags behind
the winner in each season. This rank-based measure is
both consistent with suggestions by industry experts we
consulted and in line with prior research in race-car envi-
ronments (Bothner et al. 2007, Castellucci and Ertug
2010). To be sure, we also considered alternative depen-
dent variables (e.g., normalized team points at the end
of the year), and the consistency in the results makes us
confident in our metric choice.
Our independent and control variables arise from our
thorough archival data codification. First, aided by a
panel of industry experts, we crafted a set of coding
criteria to track the 30 annual FIA regulatory changes
over our study period and the associated technological
updates in team cars. Three scholars who were inti-
mately familiar with the industry processed the coding
independently, and their results were then compared,
yielding an interrater agreement level above 0.9. This
high consistency is not surprising, as each team’s tech-
nical updates can be objectively observed via detailed
car blueprints complemented by experts’ comments pub-
lished in some of the archival sources listed above. The
coders reviewed the few diverging values carefully and
discarded those about which they could not arrive at
an agreed interpretation. The coding process led to the
two independent variables listed next and various control
variables detailed below.
Change in Technical Regulations. The magnitude of
the environmental regulatory change reflects variations
in the FIA technical rules across six core technology
areas: chassis, engine, tires, mechanics, electronics, and
aerodynamics. To develop this measure, the three coders
analyzed every regulatory release, assigning each a value
ranging from 0 (no change) to 3 (radical change) in each
of these six areas. In cases where rules altered the status
quo in a limited way, we assigned intermediate scores
of either 1 or 2. To validate our metrics, we triangulated
our scores with additional external sources, such as com-
mentaries in the specialist press. The experts’ explana-
tions and the emphases highlighted in technical articles
helped us capture the more subtle qualities of each new
rule and assess the magnitude of its influence on the
cars’ architectures. Finally, we averaged the six scores to
obtain a single overall rating for the magnitude of each
year’s regulatory change.
Extent of Firm Exploration. We used the same ap-
proach to gauge nonmandatory technological upgrades,
i.e., those executed in addition to compliance with com-
pulsory FIA demands, by examining the teams’ car
blueprints and the technical releases published in sev-
eral sources. Thus, this metric captures a team’s ten-
dency to search for technological solutions that are more
or less distant from the baseline technical setup defined
by the FIA. Components based on unexplored industry-
level knowledge belong to this explorative category. In
this sense, ours is a measure of the level of firm explo-
ration relative to expected baseline industry behavior.
Since every team’s two cars are essentially identical—or
differ only in their race setup—this variable is a team-
specific measure, and its value applies to both team cars.
Controls. We created three additional variables to
control for possible alternative time-variant explana-
tions. First, we coded teams’ decisions to replace drivers
(Change Drivers) and the chief engineers (Change Engi-
neers) for each team-year observation. For each control,
the intensity of the changes took a value of 0 (no redefi-
nition of the team), 1 (partial redefinition of the team), or
2 (full redefinition of the team). The third control, Adap-
tation Experience (AE), considers the impact of a team’s
accumulated general proficiency and experience in tech-
nological adaptation up to season t− 1. To arrive at this
measure, we first developed an index of the annual level
of generic changes in each team’s car design. F1 racing
teams design and manufacture their own car prototypes
every year, and their architectures usually include some
elements of discontinuity with respect to the prior year’s
model, but this degree of dissimilarity may vary sub-
stantially across seasons. We also obtained a measure
of degree of dissimilarity across subsequent prototypes
(call it tk for year t and team k) by reconstructing
the history of each team’s prototype after decomposing
the car into the six car architectural components listed
earlier. The coders evaluated the changes to each sub-
sequent car model in each of these areas on a scale
from 0 to 3, assigning 0 for “no change,” 3 for “major
discontinuity,” and intermediate values for incremental
component modifications, whether they were technolog-
ical fine-tunings (1) or more significant adjustments (2).
They then averaged these values across the six areas to
create an index of the level of adaptation in each team’s
prototype car. Thus, the values of tk represent the inten-
sity of the changes that team k adopts between years
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Table 1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variable Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1. Performance 0037 0026 1
2. Change Drivers 1000 0067 −0029 1
3. Change Engineers 0062 0073 −0004 0009 1
4. Adaptation Experience 1040 0079 0024 −0013 −0005 1
5. Extent of Firm Exploration 0079 0046 0015 −0014 0004 −0001 1
6. Change in Technical Regulations 0062 0045 0006 0002 0001 0004 −0006 1
t − 1 and t, and Adaptation Experience represents the
accrued values of tk from the team’s accumulated expe-
rience up to period t− 1.
Last, we also controlled for fixed effects. This is
important because such controls adjust for the standard
errors produced by repeated measures of organizations
over time, as well as helping handle any time-invariant
characteristics of the different racing teams. Each F1
team is likely to be associated with a specific group
of organizations that share a common interest in suc-
cess in the industry. Such time-invariant team-level fea-
tures that may account for superior performance include
budget levels, reputation, or any other general capabil-
ities that may help attract the best human capital or
other valuable tangible and intangible resources in the
market. Controlling for team fixed effects is particu-
larly effective in singling out the differential impacts
of the central independent variables (Change in Tech-
nical Regulations and Extent of Firm Exploration) on
performance with relatively limited confounding effects.
Table 1 reports a summary of the main descriptive statis-
tics and correlations.
Quantitative Analysis Results
To test H1 and H2, we defined two dynamic panel mod-
els, represented in Equations (1) and (2):
Yt1 k = b0+ b1Yt−11 k+ b2EXPt1 k+ b34EXPt5
2+ b4CTRt
+ b5DRt1 k+ b6CEt1 k+ b7AEt1 k+ âk+ t1 k1 (1)
Yt1 k = b0+ b1Yt−11 k+ b2EXPt1 k+ b34EXPt5
2+ b4CTRt
+ b5EXPt1 kCTRt + b6DRt1 k+ b7CEt1 k
+ b8AEt1 k+ âk+ t1 k1 (2)
where t = 11 0 0 0 1m years (or F1 seasons), k = 11 0 0 0 1 n
organizations (or F1 teams), Y denotes Performance,
CTR denotes Change in Technical Regulations, EXP
denotes Extent of Firm Exploration, DR denotes Change
Drivers, CE denotes Change Engineers, and â denotes
organization fixed effects.
We ran these two models with a generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator (Arellano and Bond 1991,
1998).6 This option offers several attractive properties
compared to canonical panel data estimation via the
ordinary least squares (OLS) method. First, it allows
us to account for performance trend effects (Roodman
2009b). Both the lagged value of the dependent vari-
able and the lagged value of the fixed effects can give
rise to dynamic panel biases, so OLS coefficient esti-
mates risk being biased and inconsistent (Nickell 1981).
Second, the GMM method provides a suitable set of
tools to account for any endogeneity, predetermination,
and reverse causality that may arise because the inde-
pendent variables Change in Technical Regulations and
Extent of Firm Exploration may correlate with error
terms in future time periods. In fact, this estimator runs
the model as a system of equations in which the vari-
ables can be instrumented with lagged variables. Thus,
by adopting the conventional approach in Stata Module
xtabond2 (Roodman 2009b), we modeled fixed effects
and controls as exogenous, the independent variables
as predetermined, and the lagged dependent variable as
endogenous. Because of the large number of panels,
the high resulting number of available moment condi-
tions was a potential source of overfitting bias (Baltagi
2009), so, as Roodman (2009a, b) suggests, the number
of instruments we used was consistently fewer than the
number of groups.
Table 2 reports the coefficients, significance levels,
and number of instruments, as well as the results of
Wald, Arellano–Bond Type 1 and 2, and Sargan–Hansen
tests (Roodman 2009b).7 Model 1 includes the con-
trols. We find a positive trend in performance that is
captured by the positive and significant coefficient in
the lagged dependent variable, confirming the bene-
fits of our choice of GMM estimation. In Model 2
(Equation (1)), with only the main effects, there is a pos-
itive and significant coefficient for Extent of Firm Explo-
ration and a negative and significant one for its quadratic
term (EXP)2, suggesting an inverted-U relationship, as
predicted in H1. To provide stronger evidence of the
inverted-U curvilinear relationship, as suggested by Lind
and Mehlum (2010), we also examined whether the posi-
tions of the extremum point fall within the range of the
observed data. Specifically, we first estimated the posi-
tion of the extremum point (B = 10665, p < 0001) on
EXP and its related confidence interval (CI) by using the
delta method (CI, 6009891203417). Then, we verified that
the confidence interval is indeed inside the data range of
EXP (i.e., CI, 6009891203417⊂ 601208337).8
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Table 2 Results of Two-Way System GMM Blundell and Bond
(1998) Model Estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 00231∗∗∗ 00133∗ 00076
4000505 4000525 4000605
Performancet−1 00347
∗ 00285∗∗ 00323∗∗
4001435 4001055 4001035
Change Drivers −00046 −00051∗ −00045∗
4000285 4000205 4000205
Change Engineers −00001 −00002 −00008
4000205 4000155 4000145
Adaptation Experience 00013 00032 00017
4000305 4000235 4000245
Extent of Firm Exploration 00174∗∗ 00258∗∗∗
4000635 4000715
(Extent of Firm Exploration)2 −00052∗ −00056∗
4000255 4000255
Change in Technical 00030 00106∗
Regulations 4000285 4000515
Firm Exploration×Change in −00127∗
Technical Regulations 4000525
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Wald (2) 35.00∗∗∗ 52.39∗∗∗ 112.40∗∗∗
# Instruments 6 18 22
AR(1) −2043∗ −2034∗ −2044∗
AR(2) 1.71 1.58 1.78
Sargan–Hansen 3.53 10.65 15.53
Notes. N = 346. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
∗p < 0005; ∗∗p < 0001; ∗∗∗p < 00001.
In Model 3 (Equation (2)), the coefficient of the two-
way interaction term between Extent of Firm Explo-
ration and Change in Technical Regulations is negative
and significant (B=−00127, p < 0005), suggesting sup-
port for H2. To gain further insight into the moderation
effect of the curvilinear relationship in Model 3, we fur-
ther conducted a graphical analysis using conventional
approaches (Aiken and West 1991, Bauer and Curran
2005, Cohen et al. 1983). Figure 1 reports the fitted val-
ues (based on Model 3) of the relationship between the
Extent of Firm Exploration and Performance at three
representative levels of the moderator (Change in Tech-
nical Regulations)—at the mean, and at minus and at
plus one standard deviation (Aiken and West 1991). The
graphical analysis fully supports the effects predicted
in H2. In fact, the level of performance peaks around an
exploration level of about 2.1, when regulatory changes
are low. In contrast, when the moderator is set one stan-
dard deviation above the mean, the value of exploration
at which performance peaks is about 1; beyond this
value, exploration becomes increasingly dysfunctional.9
To supplement the evidence from the above graphical
analysis, we proceeded as follows. We first verified that
each curve in Figure 1 has indeed an inverted-U shape
by applying the same test that we used to test H1 (Lind
and Mehlum 2010). The results of the tests confirm that
in each curve the extremum point falls within the range
Figure 1 Interaction Effect Among Change in Technical
Regulations, Exploration, and Firm Performance
0 1 2 3
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Changes in the regulations Mean–SD Mean+SDMean
of EXP. We then compared the exact estimations of
the extremum point positions in the curves obtained by
plugging in values of Change in Technical Regulations
equal to the mean minus and plus one standard deviation.
The analyses confirmed and specified the insights of the
graphical analysis as the former estimate (CTRmean−SD:
B= 20106, p < 0001) resulted to be greater than the lat-
ter (CTRmean+SD: B = 10089, p < 0001). Finally, we per-
formed a statistical test that rejected the hypothesis that
the difference between CTRmean−SD and CTRmean+SD is
null (B = 10144, p < 0005), thus providing full support
for H2.
Essentially, our statistical results indicate that although
the Extent of Firm Exploration has an inverted-U rela-
tionship with Performance, the value of exploration at
which performance peaks decreases as environmental
(i.e., regulatory) changes increase in magnitude (i.e.,
become more radical).10
Qualitative Analysis Methods
Our quantitative model above relies on precise metrics
of the Magnitude of Regulatory Changes and firm strate-
gic choices regarding the Extent of Firm Exploration
and Performance, thus enabling a faithful test of the
alternate logic put forth in this paper—i.e., that environ-
ment changes of high magnitude disturb the fit of system
architecture, thus causing the optimum trade-off point
between exploration and performance to recede. In this
section, we take further steps to articulate the precise
nature of this underlying logic by grounding an in-depth
qualitative analysis on historical archival data that helps
reveal the logical threads behind the empirical effects
shown earlier. Our methodological approach is consis-
tent with other well-known studies of organizational
capabilities involving complex processes (e.g., Gavetti
2005). Following accepted practices (e.g., Eisenhardt
1989, Siggelkow 2007, Yin 2008), we select a represen-
tative season, i.e., one with a radical regulation change,
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and contrast its effects across multiple teams following
diverse strategies (i.e., engaging in more or less exten-
sive exploration). In this study, our specific focus is
the 2009 season, and the particular radical component
involved is a new energy-efficient technology known as
the kinetic energy recovery system—or simply, KERS.
Industry experts agree that this season gave an acute
demonstration of the different teams’ approaches to
innovation vis-à-vis the changes promoted by the FIA
(Aversa 2013). In the words of Sebastian Vettel, a Red
Bull team driver, 2009 saw “the biggest change in
history of F1,” one that he felt would “spice up the
race” (AutomotiveTV.com 2009). Furthermore, the rel-
ative recentness of this season and the enormous inter-
est it excited in the media, industry, and fans afford us
access to a vast selection of secondary data. We used
online (e.g., Web crawlers) and off-line (e.g., libraries,
archives) search mechanisms to scan multiple sources
(e.g., videos, articles, industry reports, interviews, books,
audio files, pictures, and blueprints) to examine all
the managerial, strategic, and competitive aspects that
characterized the season, consulting over 300 docu-
ments (readily available from the authors on request),
the vast majority of which are used by F1 insiders
themselves (e.g., Formula1.com, BBC Sport archives,
Autosport.com, FIA official regulations, Racecar Engi-
neering, the F1 special report in the Financial Times
online, etc.). Three scholars intimately familiar with F1
examined all these files independently multiple times,
identifying keywords and critical interpretations, and
afterward discussed the archival data together and sought
a fit between their collective interpretations and infor-
mation from these external sources. To strengthen the
reliability of our triangulation, we followed the sugges-
tion of Gioia et al. (2013) that one rater should act as
a “devil’s advocate,” openly challenging the validity of
the ideas presented by the others.
This thorough archival search helped us build a broad
map of events that tracked race performance back to the
challenges of fitting new technologies to the cars’ archi-
tectures, and further back to managerial choices about
the extent of their teams’ explorations of the external
environment. For instance, when cars failed, we searched
for technical reports that provided interpretations of the
causes. Thus, we were able to trace car performance and
championship results against technological changes and
identify the core mechanisms affecting vehicle archi-
tecture and component choices, which in turn corre-
spond to teams’ choices about their exploration levels in
that season. Because official sources often report quotes
and interviews from experts and F1 professionals (e.g.,
drivers, managers, directors, suppliers), we were able
to ground our interpretations on direct comments from
the very people who lived those events. And their ret-
rospective bias was minimized because of the tempo-
ral proximity of the circumstances—for example, the
articles consulted yielded quotes from postrace press
conferences, where team managers and drivers provided
their immediate and impromptu interpretations of the sit-
uation. We selected a set of the most significant quotes
from these protagonists, and use them to enrich our
descriptive narrative of the events in the section below.
We then aggregated the first-order data into broader
second-order constructs that represent the central build-
ing blocks of our conceptual model on the perfor-
mance effects of exploration in changing environments
(see Table 3). Following accepted practices (e.g., Locke
2001, Maitlis and Lawrence 2007, Stigliani and Ravasi
2012), we summarized both first- and second-order cate-
gories and connected them to the basic interaction model
that informs our quantitative analysis presented earlier.
Finally, in collecting qualitative data from our panel,
we interviewed external informants from very different
fields (e.g., academia, F1 racing, expert media, motor-
sport historians, and F1 fans) to assess the face validity
of the causal interpretations we offer in our theoreti-
cal model. This work involved 35 hours of interaction
with a total of nine external informants, who overwhelm-
ingly corroborated our interpretations, giving us confi-
dence about the robustness and external validity of the
theoretical inferences we present. We review the regu-
latory changes that affected car design in 2009, analyze
how teams reacted in terms of their strategic exploration
choices, and finally identify the mechanisms underly-
ing the interactions between environmental changes and
exploration as it affected team performance in the F1
championship in that season.
Qualitative Analysis Results
Following some years of relative technological stabil-
ity, the FIA introduced several new rules in 2009 that
affected all components of F1 race cars: engine, chassis,
aerodynamics, mechanics, tires, and electronics. These
diverse parts have such a symbiotic codependence that
even minute changes in one (e.g., aerodynamics, engine)
could affect multiple other parts (e.g., brake mechan-
ics, weight) and have subsequent effects elsewhere (e.g.,
tire efficiencies), so the challenges of architectural fit are
quite immense, reflecting the complex nature of the race
car as a system. In addition to the challenges resulting
from these mandatory technological changes, the teams
had to cope with major limitations on their research and
development (R&D) resources in 2009: specifically, FIA
banned all in-season testing, put a strict cap on wind-
tunnel simulation time, and allowed only a maximum of
eight engines per driver over the season. These resource
restrictions were meant to equalize the playing field and
boost rivalry, but they gave F1 teams less time to study
engineering specifics for the season, and so curtailed
their ability to understand fully the consequences of the
technological advancements outlined in the new season
regulations and achieve a well-balanced car. Many teams
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Table 3 Qualitative Codification of the Model’s Variables, Mechanisms, and Effects on Performance
Second-order First-order
Model constructs constructs Empirical evidence
Independent
variable
(main effect)
High firm
exploration
KERS (Ferrari,
McLaren, BMW,
Renault)
—Device novelty: KERS is new to F1 and the automotive industry in
general
—Technology novelty: Limited understanding of the mechanical and
electrical principles to engineer the KERS
—No engineering guidelines from FIA to engineer the KERS, nor any
suggestion whether to opt for a make or buy strategy
—KERS destroys the value of present knowledge because it forces
teams to redesign the entire car modular architecture
Low firm
exploration
Double diffuser
(Brawn GP);
Improved
exhaust and
side-pod
(Red Bull)
—Established device: Common solutions in F1 and the automotive
industry in general
—Established technology: Good understanding of the engineering,
mechanical, aerodynamics, and electrical principles
—Detailed guidelines provided by FIA; former blueprints and designs
available
—Teams optimize and fine-tune the value of present knowledge as they
merely entail redesigning of parts already included in the car modular
architecture, and thus formally accepted by the governing body
Independent
variable
(moderator)
Radical regulation
change
Redefinition
of the product
architecture
—Engine: Limit of eight race/qualifying engines for the whole season
(every new engine above this eight results in 10-place grid penalty);
engine reduction from 19,000 rpm to 18,000 rpm
—Chassis: Reduction in the ground clearance of front wing from 150 mm
to 50 mm
—Aerodynamics: Ban of almost all aerodynamic devices other than front
and rear wings; reduction of rear wing width from 1,000 mm to
750 mm and increase in height from 800 mm to 950 mm; reduction in
the ground clearance of front wing from 150 mm to 50 mm and
increase in width from 1,400 mm to 1,800 mm; rear diffuser to be
longer and higher; variable front aerodynamic devices permitted
(with limits in car stability)
—Mechanics: Introduction of KERS (kinetic energy recovery system) to
store some of the energy generated under braking and convert it into
a temporary horsepower increase of around 80 hp that can be used
6.6 seconds per lap by the drivers for overtaking
—Tires: Reintroduction of the slick type
—Weight: Reduction to 1,333 lb
R&D limitations —Tests: All in-season tests banned
—Wind-tunnel: Severe hour reduction in wind-tunnel analysis
—KERS: No engineering specification provided
Underlying
mechanisms
Compound effects
of radical
regulation
change on high
firm exploration
Mechanism 1:
Problems in
architectural
redesign
—Architectural redesign: Introducing alien technology forces team to
redesign entire car architecture and the modular fit between its
different parts
—Reliability issues: Little knowledge about the KERS technology creates
problems of reliability, such as electrical shocks, battery overheating,
fire and ultimately car failure
—Modular architecture problems:
• The additional weight to fit the KERS into the cars limits the
amount of ballast available to optimize the cars’ balance
• The KERS can be applied only to light drivers
• The KERS does not fit all the driving styles and some drivers
refuse it
Mechanism 2:
Time-based
cognitive
limitations
—Lack of official guidelines on KERS increase the confusion about
selecting the best available option to engineer its technology
—Limitations in R&D (ban of in-season testing and reduction in
wind-tunnel analysis) limit the understanding of KERS and slow down
the development of complementary technologies that can maximize
KERS’ performance (i.e., DRS)
—Limitations in R&D (ban of in-season testing and reduction in
wind-tunnel analysis) constraint the understanding of the potential
benefits that KERS can actually provide during races
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Table 3 (cont’d)
Second-order First-order
Model constructs constructs Empirical evidence
Effects on the
dependent
variable
Effects on
performance
Negative
performance for
the teams who
opted for high
exploration
—Constructors’ Championship: All top-teams perform very poorly
despite benefitting from more and better resources
—Drivers’ Championship: All the top-teams drivers perform very poorly
despite their experience and the fact they race for a team with more
and better resources
Positive
performance for
the teams who
opted for low
exploration
—Constructors’ Championship: Two relatively inexperienced teams
(Brawn GP and Red Bull) get the first two positions in the ranking by
winning 14 out of 17 races
—Drivers’ Championship: Brawn GP and Red Bull’s drivers get the first
four positions in the ranking, despite their limited experience and
mediocre past results
worked around these limits by using official races to test
innovations, although this approach increased their risks
of failure and hit the more innovative teams especially
hard.
As noted above, in addition to these requirements, the
FIA’s 2009 guidelines also allowed for optional tech-
nological advancements, such as the KERS, a device
that stores the kinetic energy from the waste heat cre-
ated by the car’s brakes. Once converted into electrical
power and stored in a dedicated battery, this energy is
then made available for acceleration. Although there was
an overall push in F1 toward the development of such
fuel-efficient ecologically friendly technologies, this ini-
tiative also promised to increase viewer excitement as
the KERS facilitates overtaking. But the FIA estab-
lished very strict rules regarding its output and use, for
instance, the system could only deliver a maximum of
80 extra horsepower (about 10% over current output),
and was only allowed to be turned on for 6.6 seconds
per lap, either in a single or in multiple short bursts.
No energy recovery system had ever been adopted in F1
racing before, such that not even the FIA had been able
to provide base engineering guidelines. The core con-
cept was based on a prototypical hybrid technology, the
mechanical and electric principles of which were still
largely unknown in the industry; so KERS was new in
absolute terms, even to the most experienced teams. The
FIA allowed teams significant creative room around the
KERS design and mechanics:
Unlike the engine, there is full development freedom on
KERS. And like any new technology it’s only natural to
expect the system to develop as you learn more about
it. Every team will be updating their systems during the
season. (Paddy Lowe, McLaren Engineering Director;
Formula1.com 2008)
These qualities—that it was not a requirement, that it
was entirely new, and that teams were free to explore
it—make the KERS a suitable illustration for studying
our underlying logic. In fact, the extensive exploration of
the KERS core technology and design that teams under-
took in the 2009 season, along with the dramatic reduc-
tion in their analytical and R&D assets (that stressed
their engineers’ cognitive limits) significantly increased
the complexity of fitting and rebalancing the delicate
architecture of F1 cars. In the words of industry insiders:
KERS requires a lot of fine-tuning to the car. It has to
recharge itself—so when you press the brakes, it gener-
ates an extra resistance that you have to somehow com-
pensate for to balance it out. That means interacting with
the engine braking and the brake balance. You just have
to find the best compromise; it’s not just installing the
KERS and going quicker, you have to balance it into the
whole system. (Pedro De La Rosa, McLaren test driver;
Formula1.com 2008)
KERS does require a little extra attention from the driver.
And it certainly harms your weight distribution. You
have less weight to play with, so set-up work becomes
a little trickier. (Christian Klien, BMW test driver;
Formula1.com 2009)
In line with their continuous enthusiasm for ground-
breaking innovations, all the major teams—Ferrari,
BMW, Renault, Toyota, Williams, and McLaren—
responded with great interest to the FIA’s suggestions
about introducing the KERS, and invested considerable
preseason R&D resources into testing the device (i.e.,
they opted for higher exploration). With the exception of
Toyota and Williams, they all deployed KERS-equipped
cars at the first 2009 Grand Prix, a few months later. But
the FIA cap on R&D activities increased the uncertainty
around the system, and turned teams’ initial enthusiasm
into concerns; they actually began to wonder whether the
efforts, costs, and risks involved would be sufficiently
repaid by the potential benefits.
In contrast, the less explorative teams avoided the
KERS altogether, explaining their decisions by pointing
to the poor results from preseason tests and budget lim-
its. Ross Brawn, the celebrated former Ferrari technical
director and (from 2009) Brawn GP team principal fore-
saw some of the critical issues the KERS would bring
in terms of its value, and the many challenges involved
in debugging the car’s architectural fit:
The theoretical advantage of having KERS is perhaps 2
or 3 tenths of a second per lap 40 0 05 but you lose in
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terms of weight, packaging, and torsional moment at the
back. In any case, there is no clear decision on KERS.
I think it will take a while before we can eliminate the
disadvantages. There will be a number of KERS versions,
and perhaps 0 0 0more versions that we haven’t thought of
so far. For us the system only starts to work when we
overcome the disadvantages. (Ross Brawn, Brawn GP
Technical Director; F1 Technical 2009)
Following an alternative exploration strategy, the teams
that decided to forgo developing KERS (including Brawn
GP and Red Bull, both new upstart teams at that time)
undertook instead significant efforts to optimize exist-
ing components (i.e., they opted for less extensive explo-
ration). For example, they both introduced aerodynamic
undersides, known as double diffusers, and improved
their sidepods and exhaust systems. In contrast to the
KERS, these changes were considered more incremental
in nature and represented relatively marginal improve-
ments of existing components based on established field-
specific knowledge, to comply with the 2009 FIA rules.
Ross Brawn affirmed that the double diffuser was “an
innovative approach to an existing idea,” and, despite var-
ious complaints from rival teams, the FIA declared it a
“legal adaptation” (Aversa 2013, p. 16). Adrian Newey,
Red Bull’s chief technical director, also opted for a mod-
erately conservative exploration approach, as his team
expressed concerns over the architectural fit costs of the
KERS and suggested it was unadvisable to push explo-
ration far beyond what the regulation required:
We have taken a clean sheet, blue-sky approach, look-
ing at the implications of the rules and how to interpret
them, 0 0 0not changing things simply for the sake of it.
(Adrian Newey; Formula1.com 2009)
And indeed, Ross Brawn’s concerns materialized in
the exploration-prone teams’ experiences. Even in the
pretesting season, the adoption of the KERS revealed
problems across interfaces with various other compo-
nents. What complicated things was not merely the fact
that the KERS itself was still being developed, but that
the testing of its effective integration during the first (i.e.,
premanufacture) stages of vehicle design was limited to
simple simulations. In the words of an industry insider:
The KERS is a complex system, not only technologically
regarding the battery and the control system, but also
regarding the logistical management of the parts, which
is very complex. (Luca Marmorini, Ferrari Powertrain
Chief Engineer; Formula1.com 2011)
Because of the tightly embedded nature of the car’s
multiple components, the KERS also imposed technical
limitations on the evolution of the general car architec-
ture. For example, FIA imposes minimum-weight rules
for safety reasons, which in 2009 was 1,333 lbs, driver
included. By locating ballast units around the car, teams
could optimize the car balance taking the cars’ actual
weight up to the minimum required. But the KERS
added around 66 lbs of nonadjustable weight, thus rais-
ing balancing and torsional problems:
In practice, constructors build their racing cars much
lighter than the regulations require, and then bring them
up to the mandatory minimum by adding ballast as low
down as possible, and where it will best improve the
vehicle’s handling and reduce its tyre wear. That depends
on the driver and the circuit. With less ballast to distribute
optimally around the car, a heavier driver is already at
a competitive disadvantage. Include KERS and the car
could be out of the running altogether, despite having
a peak power 10% more than normal. The extra weight
could also rob the car of its full fuel load, forcing it to
make extra pit stops during a race. (The Economist 2009)
In subsequent phases, when drivers began testing the
F1 cars, other system misfit issues arose. Because the
KERS boost could only be activated in certain circum-
stances, it required mental as well as visual agility from
drivers to track panel indicators and nuances of the race-
track itself, which did not fit every driving style, and in
fact negatively impacted performance for some of them:
It’s how much I take my eyes off the track, that’s the
worry.0 0 0I had headaches the first time0 0 0because you’re
trying to read what the steering wheel says. (Rubens
Barrichello, Brawn GP driver; Spurgeon 2011b)
Compounding the ballast distribution problem, the
KERS was hard to implement in cars with heavy drivers.
Some teams that mounted the KERS forced their drivers
to undergo rigid diets to address the problem of nonad-
justable weight in the car architecture. But these diets
impacted their physical abilities, and several of them
struggled to perform during races:
F1 drivers found themselves not always in the best of
health thanks to their weight loss. During the extreme
heat and physical strain of some of the Formula 1 races,
driver[s] can lose up to 5 kilos of weight. At the hottest
early race of the season in 2009, Alonso also found him-
self in another very difficult situation: His water bottle
broke and he had nothing to drink throughout the race.
Having lost 5 kilos over the winter, then a further 5 kilos
or so during the race, and without anything to drink,
the Spanish driver collapsed after the race in a state of
dehydration. (Spurgeon 2011a)
With the added limitations on testing resources, teams
struggled to balance their vehicles even as the season
progressed. The fit difficulties also led to vehicle relia-
bility issues that continued throughout the season, in the
form of electrical shocks, batteries overheating, and even
fires. In fact, the 2009 season brought an increased num-
ber of car breakdowns, especially in teams that adopted
the KERS:
And as it was in an early stage of development as the
season began, it was also unreliable for many teams. The
Ferrari team suffered KERS breakdowns on race week-
ends in what became its worst season start in decades
when it failed to score any points in the first three races.
(Spurgeon 2010)
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Given these mounting problems, some teams took the
radical step of cancelling their adoption of the KERS:
We’re keeping working on our KERS. I’m not saying
we won’t run it this year but it will be difficult to run
it on the car and have the car set in its optimum per-
formance window. (Patrick Head, Williams technical
director; Formula1.com 2008)
It was not until the 2011 season that teams finally fig-
ured that an adjustable flap—the drag reduction system
(DRS)—would prove to be the only way to get the best
out of the KERS.
Essentially, qualitative evidence suggests that orga-
nizations are likely to find radical regulatory changes
challenging, in that they magnify the need to redefine
and reshape product system architecture throughout the
entire product development process. For this reason, in
this environment, strategies of greater exploration are
likely to prove suboptimal. Based on our analysis of
the qualitative evidence above, Figure 2 highlights the
causal logic in this process by isolating two mecha-
nisms that make system rebalancing a complex task:
(a) novel components drastically complicate the prob-
lems of architectural design (Mechanism 1), particularly
in the design and prototyping phases, and (b) organi-
zations’ time-based cognitive limitations (Mechanism 2)
can damage their ability to overcome such challenges
promptly, particularly during the product’s actual life.
The performance implications arising from different
exploration-based strategies corroborate our logic above.
To highlight broader nuances, we consider both the Con-
structors’ and the Drivers’ Championships. The espe-
cially turbulent regulatory environment of the 2009 sea-
son challenged all teams and led to general decreases in
car speeds compared to the previous year. And it is clear
that the teams that explored farther afield (i.e., experi-
mented with the KERS) had an even rougher year and suf-
fered significant performance handicaps. F1 teams spent
a total of US$64 million experimenting with the KERS
technology in 2009, but the innovation turned out to be
Figure 2 Problems in Architectural Redesign and Time-Based Cognitive Limitation Throughout the Product
Development Process
Design phase
[car engineering]
Prototype test
[car testing] 
Product life
[car development and tuning]
—Prototype car
—Testing phase
—Official racecar
—F1 season starts —End of the season
—New regulation
    release
Mechanism 1:
Problems in
architectural redesign
Mechanism 2:
Time-based cognitive
limitations 
less effective than teams had initially hoped. In their
best laps, KERS-equipped cars, although super charged
with some 10% additional horsepower, gained only two-
or three-tenths of a second, and saved only 0.021 liters
of fuel.
But more telling are the overall performance results,
when these gains are taken together with the difficulties
of balancing the car architecture (brakes, ballast weight,
driver fit, etc.). Published reports highlight that the teams
officially regretted their decision to explore the KERS in
the 2009 season. The teams who ended up with the best
championship results were those who opted for stan-
dard, reliable, no-frills cars that, whereas they complied
strictly with the new FIA regulations, stuck to a strategy
of more moderate exploration based on technology opti-
mization of well-established components, such as Brawn
GP’s double diffuser and Red Bull’s improved sidepod
and exhaust. The season ended up with a rare result
in F1 history, with two young and relatively inexperi-
enced teams winning first (Brawn GP) and second places
(Red Bull) in the Constructor’s Championship, record-
ing substantial point leads over the budget-rich and more
highly innovative Ferrari, McLaren, Williams, Renault,
and BMW teams. Interestingly, Ferrari (third place) and
McLaren (fourth place) scored less than half of the
points of the two top-ranked teams, whereas BMW (fifth
place) only began earning more points toward the end
of the season, when it decided to suspend the KERS
project. As “rookies,” Brawn GP and Red Bull could
hardly have been predicted to do so well. Brawn GP
was created in 2009, from a “last-minute” management
buyout of the failing Honda Racing F1 team,11 whereas
Red Bull in turn emerged from the ashes of Jaguar GP,
which is remembered as one of the least successful F1
ventures. In line with the constructor’s ranked results,
the Driver Championship went to Jenson Button (Brawn
GP), who had been a comparatively unsuccessful driver
since his debut in 2000, had not won a championship
before, and had only achieved mediocre results in the
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two previous seasons (15th in 2007 and 18th in 2008).
The young and inexperienced Sebastian Vettel of Red
Bull came second, whereas Rubens Barrichello (Brawn
GP) and Mark Webber (Red Bull) finished third and
fourth. The first top-team driver was Lewis Hamilton
(fifth), who only amassed half as many points as But-
ton. Analysts observed that the exploration of the KERS
correlated negatively with race performance:
After years of domination by McLaren, Mercedes and
Scuderia Ferrari, this season saw an underdog driver win
a Grand Prix. It was even more surprising as it was
the teams without KERS that were doing well in the
championship. (TheSportsCampus.com 2010)
The negative effects of adopting the KERS were par-
ticularly visible given the qualities of teams who lost
out, but could normally have expect better results: higher
budgets, better drivers, longer experience, and greater
visibility, among others. In sum, we believe the KERS
case offers useful theoretical insights that pinpoint the
precise logical thread underlying the findings from
our quantitative empirical model. When environmental
changes are radical, firms are likely to have to cope with
perhaps substantial problems of product architectural fit
and significant cognitive limits inherent in a fiercely
competitive and technologically dynamic environment
involving complex systems. We find that dynamic envi-
ronments can erode the rewards of intense exploratory
efforts aimed at advancing technological frontiers, which
suggests that careful analyses are required of how and
when exploration will or will not pay off.
Although we have largely focused on illustrating a
context of radical change, as our empirical model sug-
gests, our qualitative data support the evidence that the
issues that KERS adopters faced in 2009 failed to mate-
rialize in a context of limited change of the technical
regulations. Take as a representative example the case of
Williams’ car in 1993—a quite stable season in terms of
regulations changes.
Designed by Patrick Head and Adrian Newey,
Williams’ FW15C car introduced some radically inno-
vative solutions in the 1993 F1 season, such as antilock
brakes, traction control, and active suspension, together
with an improved Renault engine. Official sources agree
the FW15C was the most technologically sophisticated
Formula One car of all time. Williams’ driver Alain
Prost won the driver’s title and with 10 victories in
16 attempts, and Williams convincingly grabbed the Con-
structor’s Championship. The car had its debut in a year
of minor regulatory changes, which did not create partic-
ular challenges in fitting the new solutions within the car
architecture, which proved to be fast and reliable from
the very beginning. Official sources claim the following:
Adapted to minor regulations changes, the FW15 did
eventually make its competition debut at the start of the
1993 season as the FW15C. Unlike the FW14, it was
designed for the latest electronic devices like the fully
active suspension, so it was a much tidier package. One
of the biggest tricks up the FW15C’s sleeve was the
hugely sophisticated active suspension system that was
developed in-house at Williams. This allowed the sus-
pension to be continuously optimised for each section of
the track. Another feature was a “push-to-pass” button,
which would raise the rear ride-height and as a result
reduce the drag created by the diffuser. In addition to the
active suspension the 1993 Williams also featured trac-
tion control, ABS and fly-by-wire controls. 0 0 0 In the next
years the teams tried to reintroduce many of the driver
aids but the Formula 1 cars were never so comprehen-
sively equipped as the FW15C. This makes the Renault-
engined machine perhaps the most advanced Grand Prix
car ever built. (Ultimatecarpage.com)
Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we examine the association between explo-
ration and performance as the environment undergoes
changes of varying magnitudes. Consistent with prior
literature, we first propose that performance follows
exploration in an inverted-U trend, i.e., it first rises to
an optimum peak and then progressively drops toward a
negative tendency (H1). But our theoretical logic stresses
a distinct rationale vis-à-vis prior literature in that the
underlying mechanism behind this well-known curvi-
linear relation reflects the need to ascertain an archi-
tectural reorientation of components within a complex
system. Furthermore (and rather more importantly), we
propose and find that environmental change—considered
as industrial regulatory shifts that vary from incremental
to radical (Abernathy and Clark 1985)—negatively mod-
erates this exploration/performance relationship, such
that the more radical the regulatory changes are, the
lower the level of exploration that will be required to
reach the peak (i.e., optimal) performance payoff (H2).
We obtain empirical support for our model from a 30-
year population-level panel data set from the Formula
One racing industry, while we ground a qualitative case
discussion on a particular race season (i.e., 2009) to
unveil the underlying logic of our theory as an event of
system architectural misfit.
Our study makes significant contributions to man-
agement and organization literatures. Previous studies
have tended to suggest that there are positive gains to
increasing exploration as environments change (Aghion
et al. 2005, Blundell et al. 1999, Geroski 1995, Jansen
et al. 2006). For example, Tushman and Anderson (1986,
p. 445) explain that incremental environmental changes
tend to lead firms to pursue lower exploration strate-
gies because their core know-how tends to be confirmed,
and they tend to reach higher efficiency levels through
local learning; in contrast, radical environmental changes
tend to induce firms to pursue greater exploration strate-
gies because their core know-how tends to be destroyed.
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Although we agree with this line of argument regard-
ing the benefits of greater exploration, we consider that
the increased challenges implicit in achieving success-
ful architectural fit in complex modular technological
systems and the cognitive limitations involved in facing
radical changes in such environments can more than off-
set these gains, and suggest a more circumspect enthu-
siasm for greater levels of explorative search. Thus, we
argue that increases in the magnitude of environmental
changes can require different strategies from those sug-
gested in prior literature, such that firms may stand to
gain from less, not more, exploration as the magnitude of
environmental changes rises. In fact, a recent pioneering
study by Posen and Levinthal (2012) has already cau-
tioned that environmental changes do not automatically
suggest strategies of greater exploration. Through an ele-
gant modeling and simulation analysis, they demonstrate
that as environments change ever more frequently, the
best level of firm exploration actually recedes, given that
the novelties from exploratory efforts lose value much
more quickly when the environment changes constantly.
We concur with them in seeing a decreasing function of
exploration vis-à-vis environmental changes, rather than
a generally increasing one.
But the difference between our study and those ex-
amining the frequency of environmental change (e.g.,
Brusoni et al. 2007, Posen and Levinthal 2012) is
not merely one of domain. Earlier research has often
assumed frequency to be homologous to, or even a sub-
stitute for, magnitude (McCarthy et al. 2010, p. 608).
But, if assessments of the former help identify the value
of exploration on the basis of how quickly the nov-
elty of inventions erodes, we stress that analyses of the
latter are needed to identify misfit in systems in their
entirety. The latter argument builds on the philosophi-
cal tradition that reflects theories of complex architec-
tures of interdependent parts (Simon 1962), in which
the value of new knowledge matters less than its type.
For instance, we may detect very frequent environmental
changes of the incremental (i.e., competence enhancing)
kind, which will relieve firms from the need to search
far afield to discover new technologies. But a single (i.e.,
infrequent) radical change (i.e., competence destroying)
may demand an exploration strategy that addresses mat-
ters beyond the quick loss of a component’s novelty and
requires a thorough understanding about how quickly
a firm’s system integration capabilities may reach their
limits.
The two logics (i.e., whether the novelty of a compo-
nent discovered via exploration dwindles more quickly
versus whether the firm is less capable of integrating
new components into a system with other interdepen-
dent parts) operate at separate levels and imply different
logical predictions. In our specific F1 environment, reg-
ulatory changes are utterly predictable in their frequency
(the FIA releases new rules every year at its preseason
meeting), enabling teams to rule out unexpected tech-
nical changes and engineer new components ahead of
time. But the magnitude of these changes can vary dras-
tically, so the observed curvilinear performance value of
exploration highlights a key—but so far overlooked—
logical mechanism about system complexity and modu-
lar interdependence. Hence, the performance of a system
may crumble even when exploration brings about supe-
rior technologies at the component level. In this regard, it
is important to underline that our research further departs
from Posen and Levinthal’s (2012), since whereas their
simulation model considers issues linked with the search
for optimal strategies in frequently changing environ-
ments, we focus on firm challenges in executing their
change efforts. Hence, by discriminating between the
frequency and the magnitude of environmental change,
we attempt to both answer the call for greater preci-
sion in the conceptualization of environmental change
(McCarthy et al. 2010, p. 604) and to extend recent
propositions about the receding value of exploration in
extant literature (i.e., Posen and Levinthal 2012) to new
domains.
Accordingly, our study demonstrates that architectural
knowledge must be considered when changes vary from
incremental to radical, and so present different chal-
lenges to a firm’s know-how (Baldwin and Clark 2000,
2003; Brusoni et al. 2001; Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004).
The notions of system complexity (Simon 1962) and
architectural fit (Henderson and Clark 1990) shed light
on various areas of management research, such as orga-
nizational form heterogeneity (Levinthal 1997, p. 935;
Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005), variance in organizational
evolution paths (Levinthal and Marino 2015, Siggelkow
2002), and the balance of novel and existing managerial
decisions (Rivkin and Siggelkow 2003). Our study not
only builds on this tradition, but in fact brings the notion
of system integration capabilities (Brusoni et al. 2001,
2007; Prencipe 1997) to the study of exploration on the
part of firms facing shifts of greater magnitude in their
environments. This concept of capabilities gains further
relevance insofar as our qualitative analysis demonstrates
that they can be a decisive factor in determining how far
exploration can help or hinder the performance of orga-
nizations that compete on the basis of complex systems.
More generally, we warn that the relationship between
exploration and performance is moderated by environ-
mental (i.e., regulatory) changes that challenge firms
to integrate new components into their complex prod-
uct architectures. This warning is particularly relevant
considering the tendency stressed in prior literature that
firms engage in riskier exploration efforts when envi-
ronmental changes make adaptation more problematic
(Denrell and March 2001).
Along these lines, the competing approaches by F1
teams revealed by our 2009 season case study yield
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insights into the intricacies of the underlying theoret-
ical causal mechanisms. In fact, this independent case
analysis reveals that the significant perceptual challenges
firms can suffer when confronted by major environmen-
tal changes are at the root of the problems of archi-
tectural fit (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000, Tripsas and
Gavetti 2000). In line with our findings of an inverted-
U-shaped relationship between exploration efforts and
performance outcomes, there seems to be a limit to
the amount of change organizations can handle, beyond
which they are unable to foresee the real benefits of
more exploration, or even synchronize new technologies
with all the other changes that are in progress. Hence,
as we integrate architectural fit and cognitive challenges,
we also contribute to the literature on modularity and fit
(Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004, Siggelkow 2002) by unveil-
ing some of the underlying mechanisms that influence
the interplay between contingencies and technological
architectures. In fact, our analysis confirms prior find-
ings that awareness of time and deadlines play a key
role in achieving organizational goals (Gersick 1988).
More precisely, our data suggest that a timely cognitive
awareness of the complexity of their own product maps
allowed successful F1 teams to best estimate the optimal
level of exploration their development projects required.
Thus, we also contribute to prior empirical literature
focused on information processing as a key aspect to
be considered in understanding exploration timing by
providing a more specific link of between the cognitive
limitations associated with intense exploration and the
consequences for complex product architectures (Walsh
1988). Furthermore, our study identifies a contingency in
which the reference point that serves best to identify the
optimal pace of strategic change shifts from the sphere
of the competitors’ action to that of the environment.
Specifically, this contributes to the debate on the relative
speed of change (Brown and Eisenhardt 1995, Gersick
1994, Katila and Chen 2008, Nadkarni and Narayanan
2007b) by suggesting that when environmental shifts are
radical, the pace of a firm’s change may be more con-
strained by the internal execution of highly innovative
projects than by its limited perceptions of competitors’
moves. More broadly, we also respond to the sugges-
tion by Gavetti et al. (2007) that analyzing organiza-
tional action and dynamics requires multiple lenses that
include both behavioral and cognitive perspectives.
When it comes to assessing the value of regulatory
changes to spurring innovation, a growing group of strat-
egy and management scholars (e.g., Butler and Carney
1986, Hambrick and Abrahamson 1995, Kale and Anand
2006, Porter 1996, Wiseman and Catanach 1997) have
made significant contributions. We build on this tradi-
tion by offering a systematic analysis of well-codified
changes in the magnitude of technological shifts. We
think that a careful scrutiny of specific theory elements,
rather than the all-inclusive event case study approach
often adopted, may help refine many of the theories
prevalent in the field. Moreover, the study of regulatory
changes also implies that policy makers interested in
fostering innovation (Porter 1996) should be conscious
of the organizational costs associated with firms’ explo-
ration efforts (a few are made explicit in our model),
to avoid decreases (rather than the intended increases)
in overall welfare for buyers and sellers. Finally, our
empirical setting offers a unique opportunity to study
firm behaviors under environmental changes generated
exogenously by an independent authority. So our setting
represents a useful laboratory in which to study these
dynamics in isolation—an empirical task that can be
very challenging in other industries.
Our study also suggests important implications for
practice. Managers often display a bias toward action, in
which they tend overwhelmingly to believe that there is
an ever-increasingly positive relationship between explo-
ration and performance gains (Peters and Waterman
1982). Organizations already accustomed to changing
are more likely to change in the future (Beck et al.
2008). In our study we suggest that this approach can
be mistaken, especially when environmental changes
increase in magnitude. Once implicit systems-fit costs
are considered, a more favorable approach to explo-
ration may be advisable, not when the environment
destroys the know-how base from which firms compete
(i.e., when regulatory changes are radical), but precisely
when such changes are incremental, when firms are more
prone to merely refining existing know-how and con-
firming current competences. So managerial discretion
is needed to assess not only the firm’s level of cognitive
inertia (Tripsas and Gavetti 2000), but also its cogni-
tive capacity to develop exploratory solutions to respond
to radically shifting environments. Different individ-
ual approaches (i.e., of managers versus entrepreneurs)
toward exploration have also been recently investigated
in a series of studies that use a neuroscience lens to
study systematic bias toward action (Laureiro-Martínez
et al. 2014, 2015). Our analysis in the F1 industry con-
tributes to this recent stream of research by exploring the
“macrofoundations” of these mechanisms and biases.
Along those lines, our study suggests that less explo-
ration is better in radically changing environments, and
that imitation and even reverse engineering of technolo-
gies may be the best approaches where firm’s operating
environments undergo changes of greater magnitude,
a notion that is consistent with recent anecdotal stud-
ies praising the value of copycat strategies in turbulent
environments (Jenkins 2014, Shenkar 2010). In other
words, we believe our theory can inform firms con-
sidering imitation—as an alternative to developing new
products themselves—that such an approach is likely
to increase in value as the magnitude of environmen-
tal change rises. So our study helps explain competi-
tive dynamics that span well beyond the F1 industry,
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such as the failure of GM and other car manufactur-
ers to shift their core knowledge fundamentally toward
electrical vehicles at a time when external contingencies
favor more prudent efforts to change established gaso-
line engines into hybrids, or to increase their efficiency,
as Ford did with the EcoBoost technology (Posen and
Levinthal 2012).
Certainly our study is not perfect, and it points the
way to important opportunities for further inquiries.
Former research has already addressed limitations and
parallels between F1 and other knowledge-intensive sec-
tors such as research-intensive industries like medi-
cal instrumentation and aerospace (Aversa et al. 2015;
Jenkins 2010, 2014; Pinch and Henry 1999). If on
the one hand F1 firms face extremely complex tech-
nological challenges, they also enjoy the benefits of
an almost intelligible competitive arena, where sources
of change (e.g., updates in the regulations or play-
ers’ moves) are easier to track and forecast compared
to what happens in other industries. This makes F1
a special field where the most critical success fac-
tor is perhaps related to adapting the delicate product
architecture to exogenous changes, rather than forecast-
ing possible scenarios beforehand. On the other hand,
the joint effect of fast-moving and regulatory forces
(aimed at maximizing competitive balance) dampen the
life cycle of an innovation—and its related rents—and
thus strongly reduce the possibility of long-term com-
petitive advantages. Thus, our results better apply to
highly dynamic contexts, whereas in traditional indus-
tries firms’ exploratory innovation might be able to pro-
vide longer superior rents before urging the firm toward
additional efforts. It is noteworthy that to engender inter-
nal consistency and deeper understanding of the rela-
tionship between optimal exploration and environmental
change, we developed our study within a single industry,
and our empirical F1 setting may involve some idiosyn-
cratic limitations, such as the impossibility of using
an economic profitability measure as a proxy for firm
performance. Hence, future research that expands our
analysis to other industries may need to address other
dimensions of environmental change, and additional
analyses could also tackle other environmental condi-
tions that might induce such inflection points, such as the
focus of change. Finally, despite the merits of our com-
bined quantitative–qualitative (i.e., quanti–quali) empir-
ical approach, involving both broad statistical analyses
and fine-grained mechanisms unearthed by a grounded
case analysis, further research may develop empirical
research designs that can operationalize and test our sug-
gested mediators, as well as the main associations, in
other ways.
All in all, we conclude that environmental shifts
should not simply induce firms to adopt strategies
involving greater or lower levels of exploration mechan-
ically. Instead, more specific and environmental-specific
analyses should be used to identify the intrinsic costs
and benefits of such endeavors, particularly those per-
taining to system architecture. The question regarding
the appropriate organizational response to environmental
change is a central topic for organizations and strate-
gic management, so understanding the tensions involved
will remain a fertile ground for new inquiries. We hope
our study will help motivate more such initiatives.
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Endnotes
1See Gupta et al. (2006) for a comprehensive review of these
different positions.
2Simon (1962) refers to this as the system’s degree of decom-
posability (cf. Nickerson and Zenger 2004).
3Assuming a rather stable environment (or one that only
changes incrementally), firms with context-specific capabili-
ties will earn a competitive advantage over those that possess
context-generic capabilities (Porter 1985). But as the environ-
ment changes more radically, the Context specificity of the
resource (and hence, its value superiority) decreases quickly,
so eroding this advantage. For example, the use of pesticides in
farming is known to boost crop yields, and sellers of patented
formulas have an edge over rivals that sell generics. How-
ever, should the patented formula suffer from new regulatory
bans, this competitive advantage would end. As the literature
argues, this “equalization” would drive firms into new explo-
rative endeavors.
4Regulations may be aimed at introducing or restricting the use
of new technologies, but qualitative evidence (available from
the authors on request) reveals that in both cases they pro-
duce similar effects on firms’ behaviors. In fact, the evidence
we examine shows that regulatory changes end up enhanc-
ing technological heterogeneity at the firm level, as players
always strive to find ways to work around the regulations.
Thus, a regulation may forbid a specific solution, but often
does not concomitantly ban all the alternative devices/solutions
that could be used as functional alternatives. Another key
aspect regarding the distinct types of technical regulations is
that the changes in the rules may, in theory, have contrasting
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effects in different organizations. However, the qualitative data
coded during our study show little evidence in support of this
argument.
5Cars that failed to finish a race were automatically assigned
to the last position in that race.
6Since the persistence of the dependent variable could cause
weak instrument problems, we opted to use the system-
GMM estimation rather than the difference-GMM technique
(Arellano and Bond 1991, 1998).
7The robust standard errors were computed conventionally
by applying the Windmeijer (2005) correction. The Sargan–
Hansen test did not report significant coefficients for either
model, indicating that our instruments were suitable; similarly,
the results of the Arellano–Bond tests indicate the absence of
second-order autocorrelation.
8Note that Lind and Mehlum (2010) observe that determining
whether the (1− 2) confidence interval for the extremum is
within the range of the x variable is equivalent to running the
Sasabuchi (1980) test at the  level of significance.
9As the environment changes more radically, the level of per-
formance registered at the peak of the inverted-U shape (unsur-
prisingly) decreases. In fact, because environmental shocks
generally render existing products and technologies less valu-
able, it is plausible that immediately after such shocks occur,
even top performers can only achieve suboptimal product
configurations.
10Our framing assumes environmental changes to be exoge-
nous to the activities of firms, that is, as resulting from impo-
sitions by an external agency, rather than from a Schumpete-
rian process triggered by the firms themselves. But one can
still suspect regulatory changes in F1 may be endogenous—
for example, that they may involve favoritism, or some other
superordinate interest by a team with undue influence on the
FIA—and so question the validity of the analysis. To exam-
ine this possibility, we inspected the reasoning the FIA gave
for each proposed regulatory change closely, and in each
case found that they aimed to decrease team dominance and
improve public welfare (e.g., rules to reduce negligent behav-
ior and improve driver safety, technical standards to improve
the chances of vehicle overtaking and thus increase fan enter-
tainment, budget limitations to reduce costs and balance the
chances of cash-rich against cash-poor teams, and rules regard-
ing sponsorship display in cars to improve revenue). We also
verified whether the issuance of new rules coincided with the
dominance of particular teams. Indeed, we found that the 2009
regulatory shock was partly deliberately intended to break
a rapidly increasing concentration in performance and team
dominance. To check for the robustness of the results, we
repeated the regression analysis excluding that year, but found
no relevant variations in the findings for either the estimates
of the coefficients or their statistical significance.
11Nick Fry and Ross Brawn (former general manager and
technical director at Honda F1, respectively) took over the
company and re-founded it as Brawn GP, after several failed
attempts to find an alternative buyer.
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